A Bill for an Act
Page 1, Line 101Concerning state court remedies for violations of federal
Page 1, Line 102constitutional rights occurring during immigration
Page 1, Line 103enforcement, and, in connection therewith, making an
Page 1, Line 104appropriation.
Bill Summary
(Note: This summary applies to this bill as introduced and does not reflect any amendments that may be subsequently adopted. If this bill passes third reading in the house of introduction, a bill summary that applies to the reengrossed version of this bill will be available at http://leg.colorado.gov.)
The bill creates a statutory cause of action for a person who is injured during a civil immigration enforcement action by another person who, whether or not under color of law, violates the United States constitution while participating in civil immigration enforcement. A person who violates the United States constitution while participating in civil immigration enforcement is liable to the injured party for legal or equitable relief or any other appropriate relief. The action must be commenced within 2 years after the cause of action accrues.
This Unofficial Version Includes Committee
Amendments Not Yet Adopted on Second Reading
Page 2, Line 1Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Colorado:
Page 2, Line 2SECTION 1. Legislative declaration. (1) The general assembly
Page 2, Line 3finds and declares that:
Page 2, Line 4(a) Since the earliest days of the nation, the United States supreme
Page 2, Line 5court has held, in cases such as Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804), and
Page 2, Line 6Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. 64 (1804), that federal officials
Page 2, Line 7may be liable in damages for violations of federal laws;
Page 2, Line 8(b) In later 19th century cases as well, the United States supreme
Page 2, Line 9court held that federal officials could be liable for damages even for
Page 2, Line 10reasons relating to but beyond the lawful scope of federal duties, Mitchell
Page 2, Line 11v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115 (1851), and in particular that state courts
Page 2, Line 12possessed jurisdiction to consider such damages claims, Teal v. Felton,
Page 2, Line 1353 U.S. 284 (1852);
Page 2, Line 14(c) The United States supreme court has long held that federal
Page 2, Line 15employees are not inherently beyond the reach of state laws simply
Page 2, Line 16because they are federal employees. For example, in Johnson v.
Page 2, Line 17Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920), the court noted, "[A]n employee of the
Page 2, Line 18United States does not secure a general immunity from state law while
Page 2, Line 19acting in the course of his employment", and in Colorado v. Symes, 286
Page 2, Line 20U.S. 510 (1932), the court stated, "Federal officers and employees are not,
Page 2, Line 21merely because they are such, granted immunity from prosecution in state
Page 2, Line 22courts for crimes against state law".
Page 2, Line 23(d) Decades later, the United States supreme court continued to
Page 3, Line 1recognize the role of state law in holding federal officials accountable for
Page 3, Line 2legal violations, noting in Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963),
Page 3, Line 3"[w]hen it comes to suits for damages for abuse of power, federal
Page 3, Line 4officials are usually governed by local law";
Page 3, Line 5(e) When the United States supreme court recognized a federal
Page 3, Line 6law cause of action for violation of certain constitutional rights in Bivens
Page 3, Line 7v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), that cause
Page 3, Line 8of action was in addition to, rather than instead of, traditional state law
Page 3, Line 9remedies. Even one of the dissenting justices in Bivens noted the ongoing
Page 3, Line 10role of state courts, writing, "The task of evaluating the pros and cons of
Page 3, Line 11creating judicial remedies for particular wrongs is a matter for Congress
Page 3, Line 12and the legislatures of the States".
Page 3, Line 13(f) More recently, congress has made federal statutory law the
Page 3, Line 14exclusive remedy for certain claims sounding in tort, but this exclusivity
Page 3, Line 15specifically "does not extend or apply to a civil action against an
Page 3, Line 16employee of the Government [. . .] which is brought for a violation of the
Page 3, Line 17Constitution of the United States", 28 U.S.C. sec. 2679. The prime
Page 3, Line 18sponsor of legislation amending the federal "Tort Claims Act" to provide
Page 3, Line 19for limited exclusivity took pains to clarify, "We make special provisions
Page 3, Line 20here to make clear that the more controversial issue of constitutional torts
Page 3, Line 21is not covered by this bill. If you are accused of having violated
Page 3, Line 22someone's constitutional rights, this bill does not affect it", 134 Cong.
Page 3, Line 23Rec. 15963 (1988).
Page 3, Line 24(g) In 2022, in declining to extend the scope of the Bivens action
Page 3, Line 25in Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022), the United States supreme court
Page 3, Line 26observed that legislatures, not courts, are the better branches of
Page 3, Line 27government to fashion damages remedies;
Page 4, Line 1(h) In its most recently completed term, the United States supreme
Page 4, Line 2court declined, in Martin v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 1689 (2025), to
Page 4, Line 3extend the doctrine of supremacy clause immunity beyond its traditional
Page 4, Line 4criminal law context;
Page 4, Line 5(i) Violating the federal constitutional rights of residents of the
Page 4, Line 6United States has never been and can never be "necessary and proper" to
Page 4, Line 7the execution of the laws and powers of the United States within the
Page 4, Line 8meaning of article I, section 8, clause 18 of the United States constitution;
Page 4, Line 9and
Page 4, Line 10(j) In enacting this act, the Colorado general assembly affirms its
Page 4, Line 11longstanding and rightful role as a sovereign state in providing forum in
Page 4, Line 12its courts for adjudication of claims of federal constitutional violations.
Page 4, Line 13SECTION 2. In Colorado Revised Statutes, add 13-20-1302 as
Page 4, Line 14follows:
Page 4, Line 1513-20-1302. Civil action for violation of constitutional rights
Page 4, Line 16during immigration enforcement - relief - attorney fees - time limit to
Page 4, Line 17commence action - definition.
Page 4, Line 18(1) A person who has their rights that are guaranteed by
Page 4, Line 19the United States constitution violated by another person who,
Page 4, Line 20acting under color of any federal, state or local law, is
Page 4, Line 21participating in civil immigration enforcement, may bring a civil
Page 4, Line 22action against the other person. A person found to have
Page 4, Line 23violated the United States constitution while participating in
Page 4, Line 24civil immigration enforcement is liable to the person whose
Page 4, Line 25rights are violated for legal or equitable relief or any other
Page 4, Line 26appropriate relief.
Page 4, Line 27(2) (a) In an action brought pursuant to this section, a
Page 5, Line 1court shall award reasonable attorney fees and costs to a
Page 5, Line 2prevailing plaintiff. In actions for injunctive relief, a court
Page 5, Line 3shall deem a plaintiff to have prevailed if the plaintiff's suit was
Page 5, Line 4a substantial factor or significant catalyst in obtaining the
Page 5, Line 5results sought by the litigation.
Page 5, Line 6(b) When a judgment is entered in favor of a defendant,
Page 5, Line 7the court may award reasonable costs and attorney fees to the
Page 5, Line 8defendant for defending any claims the court finds frivolous.
Page 5, Line 9(3) To the maximum extent permissible under the United
Page 5, Line 10States constitution and 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983, a grant of immunity
Page 5, Line 11to a defendant, including, but not limited to, sovereign
Page 5, Line 12immunity; official immunity; intergovernmental immunity;
Page 5, Line 13qualified immunity; supremacy clause immunity; statutory
Page 5, Line 14immunity, including the "Colorado Governmental Immunity
Page 5, Line 15Act", article 10 of title 24; or common law immunity, does not
Page 5, Line 16apply in an action brought pursuant to this section.
Page 5, Line 17(4) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise
Page 5, Line 18requires, "civil immigration enforcement" means an action to
Page 5, Line 19investigate, question, detain, transfer, or arrest a person for
Page 5, Line 20the purpose of enforcing federal civil immigration law. "Civil
Page 5, Line 21immigration enforcement" does not include an action committed
Page 5, Line 22by a peace officer who is acting within the scope of the peace
Page 5, Line 23officer's duties consistent with state law.
Page 5, Line 24(5) Pursuant to section 13-80-102, a civil action described
Page 5, Line 25in this section must be commenced within two years after the
Page 5, Line 26cause of action accrues.
Page 5, Line 27SECTION 3. In Colorado Revised Statutes, 13-80-102, amend
Page 6, Line 1(1)(k); and add (1)(l) as follows:
Page 6, Line 213-80-102. General limitation of actions - two years.
Page 6, Line 3(1) The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon
Page 6, Line 4which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, must be
Page 6, Line 5commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not
Page 6, Line 6thereafter:
Page 6, Line 7(k) All actions brought
under pursuant to section 13-21-109 (2);Page 6, Line 8and
Page 6, Line 9(l) An action alleging a violation of constitutional rights
Page 6, Line 10during civil immigration enforcement brought pursuant to
Page 6, Line 11section 13-20-1302.
Page 6, Line 12SECTION 4. Severability. If any provision of this act or the
Page 6, Line 13application of this act to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the
Page 6, Line 14invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the act that
Page 6, Line 15can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to
Page 6, Line 16this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.
Page 6, Line 17SECTION 5. Appropriation. (1) For the 2026-27 state fiscal
Page 6, Line 18year, $125,604 is appropriated to the department of law. This
Page 6, Line 19appropriation is from the legal services cash fund created in section
Page 6, Line 2024-31-108 (4), C.R.S., from revenue received from the department of
Page 6, Line 21personnel that is continuously appropriated to the department of personnel
Page 6, Line 22from the risk management fund created in section 24-30-1510 (1)(a),
Page 6, Line 23C.R.S. The appropriation to the department of law is based on an
Page 6, Line 24assumption that the department of law will require an additional 0.5 FTE.
Page 6, Line 25To implement this act, the department of law may use this appropriation
Page 6, Line 26to provide legal services for the department of personnel.
Page 6, Line 27SECTION 6. Safety clause. The general assembly finds,
Page 7, Line 1determines, and declares that this act is necessary for the immediate
Page 7, Line 2preservation of the public peace, health, or safety or for appropriations for
Page 7, Line 3the support and maintenance of the departments of the state and state
Page 7, Line 4institutions.