A Bill for an Act
Page 1, Line 101Concerning the resiliency of the systems that provide
Page 1, Line 102electricity in relation to geomagnetic storms.
Bill Summary
(Note: This summary applies to this bill as introduced and does not reflect any amendments that may be subsequently adopted. If this bill passes third reading in the house of introduction, a bill summary that applies to the reengrossed version of this bill will be available at http://leg.colorado.gov.)
The bill requires the public utilities commission (commission) to evaluate electrical generation and grid resilience against geomagnetic storms (evaluation) and report the findings of the evaluation to the general assembly. The bill sets standards for the evaluation. Based on the evaluation, the commission shall adopt rules requiring an electrical utility to meet resiliency standards for geomagnetic storms. The rules include:
- Requiring the monitoring of the space weather prediction center of the national oceanic and atmospheric administration in order to isolate large power transformers and power generation from the grid;
- Mechanically isolating critical components if or when a coronal mass ejection is likely to cause geomagnetically induced currents;
- Restricting or closing fuel pipeline valves to mitigate damage in a sectional failure;
- Installing automatic neutral ground blocking devices in large power transformers;
- Ensuring that computer equipment can be mechanically isolated from the grid and sheltered from geomagnetically induced surges;
- Requiring all networked systems that operate electrical generation and distribution to be electronically and physically separable from the outside networks; and
- Requiring the cyber-certification of hardware and software that operate electrical generation and distribution.
This Unofficial Version Includes Committee
Amendments Not Yet Adopted on Second Reading
Page 2, Line 1Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Colorado:
Page 2, Line 2SECTION 1. Legislative declaration. (1) The general assembly finds and declares that:
Page 2, Line 3(a) According to the federal cybersecurity and infrastructure
Page 2, Line 4security agency, "The U.S. energy infrastructure fuels the economy of the
Page 2, Line 521st century. Without a stable energy supply, health and welfare are
Page 2, Line 6threatened and the U.S. economy cannot function. Presidential Policy
Page 2, Line 7Directive 21 identifies the Energy Sector as uniquely critical because it
Page 2, Line 8provides an 'enabling function' across all critical infrastructure sectors.
Page 2, Line 9More than 80 percent of the country's energy infrastructure is owned by
Page 2, Line 10the private sector, supplying fuels to the transportation industry,
Page 2, Line 11electricity to households and businesses, and other sources of energy that are integral to growth and production across the nation."
Page 2, Line 12(b) Coronal mass ejections and solar flares are natural and
Page 3, Line 1unavoidable, and therefore are essential considerations for mitigation in
Page 3, Line 2"advancing climate resilient development" that must be considered "in the
Page 3, Line 3design and planning of settlements and infrastructure", according to the
Page 3, Line 4Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Summary for Policymakers,
Page 3, Line 5Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of
Page 3, Line 6Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the
Page 3, Line 7Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University
Page 3, Line 8Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 3-32; and
Page 3, Line 9(c) The participation of transmission utilities in organized
Page 3, Line 10wholesale markets and the implementation of the "Colorado Electric
Page 3, Line 11Transmission Authority Act", article 42 of title 40, Colorado Revised
Page 3, Line 12Statutes, will assist transmission utilities and the Colorado electric
Page 3, Line 13transmission authority in ensuring the resilience of the electric grid and
Page 3, Line 14its resistance to both natural disasters and intentional attacks.
Page 3, Line 15Accordingly, the public utilities commission should use all available
Page 3, Line 16means to support these entities in preparing for, and documenting their
Page 3, Line 17ability to mitigate, any threats identified in the 2016 Colorado energy assurance emergency plan.
Page 3, Line 18(2) The general assembly further finds and declares that:
Page 3, Line 19(a) Geomagnetic storms are major disturbances of earth's
Page 3, Line 20magnetosphere that occur when there is a very efficient exchange of
Page 3, Line 21energy from solar wind into earth's environment. The storms transfer
Page 3, Line 22energy into the earth's magnetosphere, resulting in major changes in
Page 3, Line 23currents, plasmas, and fields. These changes are often preceded by
Page 3, Line 24coronal mass ejections, which are massive eruptions of plasma expelled
Page 3, Line 25from the sun's corona.
Page 4, Line 1(b) Solar flares emit radiation in all bands of the electromagnetic
Page 4, Line 2spectrum, affect little more than radio communication, and arrive in 8 minutes;
Page 4, Line 3(c) Coronal mass ejections often occur with solar flares, but each
Page 4, Line 4can take place in the absence of the other. Coronal mass ejections take several days to reach the earth.
Page 4, Line 5(d) Coronal mass ejections are large expulsions of plasma and
Page 4, Line 6magnetic field from the sun's corona. They can eject billions of tons of
Page 4, Line 7coronal material and carry an embedded magnetic field morphing
Page 4, Line 8polarities as it travels in space and that is stronger than the background
Page 4, Line 9solar wind interplanetary magnetic field strength. Coronal mass ejections
Page 4, Line 10travel outward from the sun at speeds ranging from slower than 250
Page 4, Line 11kilometers per second to as fast as nearly 3,000 kilometers per second.
Page 4, Line 12The fastest earth-directed coronal mass ejections can reach our planet in
Page 4, Line 13as little as 15 to 18 hours. Slower coronal mass ejections can take several days to arrive.
Page 4, Line 14(e) The polarity of a coronal mass ejection can usually be
Page 4, Line 15determined at the Lagrange point, which is the gravitationally balanced
Page 4, Line 16point between the earth and the sun and is approximately 1.5 million kilometers from earth;
Page 4, Line 17(f) At the Lagrange point, coronal mass ejections are 10 to 45 minutes from earth;
Page 4, Line 18(g) If a coronal mass ejection is the same polarity as the earth's
Page 4, Line 19geomagnetic field, the coronal mass ejection will tend to be deflected. If
Page 4, Line 20a coronal mass ejection is opposite the earth's polarity, however, the
Page 4, Line 21earth's magnetic field will act to draw the energy into the earth's poles,
Page 4, Line 22creating disturbances in the earth's magnetic field, inducing electrical
Page 5, Line 1currents in metal objects such as pipelines and electrical wires, or
Page 5, Line 2generating destructive heat in transformers due to an offset direct current charge.
Page 5, Line 3(h) The result of geomagnetic storms is that electric current is
Page 5, Line 4generated in the magnetosphere and ionosphere, which generates
Page 5, Line 5electromagnetic fields at the ground level. The movement of magnetic
Page 5, Line 6fields around a conductor induces an electrical current. The excess current can cause voltage collapse or permanent damage to large transformers.
Page 5, Line 7(i) Geomagnetic storms are classified G 1 to G 5 based on a
Page 5, Line 8quasi-logarithmic classification system developed by the national oceanic
Page 5, Line 9and atmospheric administration. The strongest storms are G 5 class
Page 5, Line 10storms. The smallest ones are G 1 class storms (near background levels). These levels are classified as follows:
Page 5, Line 11(I) G 5 means extreme, which is expected to occur for 4 days in
Page 5, Line 12each 11-year cycle, leading to widespread voltage control problems and
Page 5, Line 13possibly protective system problems. Some grid systems may experience
Page 5, Line 14complete collapse or blackouts. Pipeline currents can reach hundreds of amps.
Page 5, Line 15(II) G 4 means severe, which is expected to occur for 4 days in
Page 5, Line 16each 11-year cycle, leading to possible widespread voltage control
Page 5, Line 17problems and some protective systems mistakenly tripping. Induced pipeline currents may affect preventive measures.
Page 5, Line 18(III) G 3 means strong, which is expected to occur for 60 days in
Page 5, Line 19each 11-year cycle, possibly necessitating voltage corrections and triggering false alarms;
Page 5, Line 20(IV) G 2 means moderate, which is expected to occur for 360 days
Page 5, Line 21in each 11-year cycle, with long duration storms possibly causing transformer damage; and
Page 6, Line 1(V) G 1 means minor, which is expected to occur for 900 days in each 11-year cycle and which may induce weak power-grid fluctuations.
Page 6, Line 2SECTION 2. In Colorado Revised Statutes, add 40-2-125.6 as follows:
Page 6, Line 340-2-125.6. Electrical generation and distribution resiliency -
Page 6, Line 4evaluation - report - legislative recommendations - repeal. (1) Each
Page 6, Line 5electrical utility shall, by July 1, 2026, evaluate the reliability
Page 6, Line 6of electrical generation and grid resilience after experiencing
Page 6, Line 7geomagnetic storms and submit a report of the evaluation to the commission. The evaluation must:
Page 6, Line 8(a) Include electricity generation from multiple sources;
Page 6, Line 9(b) Use fifty- and one-hundred-year projections for system reliability; and
Page 6, Line 10(c) Evaluate the ability of and identify shortfalls to
Page 6, Line 11restoring electrical power operation within the following timelines for the following types of geomagnetic storms:
Page 6, Line 12(I) For a G 5 rated geomagnetic storm:
(A) Power generation resuming within five days;
Page 6, Line 13(B) Recovery of critical infrastructure within one week;
Page 6, Line 14(C) Transmission lines and nodes operating within two weeks; and
Page 6, Line 15(D) Community distribution of electricity within two weeks;
Page 6, Line 16(II) For a G 4 rated geomagnetic storm:
Page 6, Line 17(A) Power generation resuming within three days;
Page 7, Line 1(B) Recovery of critical infrastructure within three days;
Page 7, Line 2(C) Transmission lines and nodes operating within one week; and
Page 7, Line 3(D) Community distribution of electricity within two weeks;
Page 7, Line 4(III) For a G 3 rated geomagnetic storm:
(A) Power generation resuming within two days;
Page 7, Line 5(B) Recovery of critical infrastructure within two days;
Page 7, Line 6(C) Transmission lines and nodes operating within three days; and
Page 7, Line 7(D) Community distribution of electricity within one week; and
Page 7, Line 8(IV) For a G 1 or G 2 rated geomagnetic storm, no more than a brief interruption of electric service.
Page 7, Line 9(2) (a) By January 2027, the department of regulatory
Page 7, Line 10agencies shall include, as part of its presentation during its
Page 7, Line 11"SMART Act" hearing required by section 2-7-203, the results of
Page 7, Line 12the compilation and analysis required by subsection (3) of this section.
Page 7, Line 13(b) This subsection (2) is repealed, effective July 1, 2027.
Page 7, Line 14(3) After receiving the reports required in subsection (1)
Page 7, Line 15of this section, the commission shall compile and analyze the
Page 7, Line 16reports. Upon completion of the compilation and analysis, the
Page 7, Line 17commission shall make recommendations to the general
Page 7, Line 18assembly concerning legislation that requires electric utilities
Page 7, Line 19to develop a coronal-mass-ejection plan to ensure electrical
Page 8, Line 1generation and distribution resilience. The legislative recommendations must:
Page 8, Line 2(a) Set reliability standards but not dictate the method of compliance;
Page 8, Line 3(b) Require monitoring of the space weather prediction
Page 8, Line 4center of the national oceanic and atmospheric administration in order to:
Page 8, Line 5(I) Prepare to isolate large power transformers and
Page 8, Line 6power generation from the grid if a coronal mass ejection is detected with a potential earth-orbit intersection;
Page 8, Line 7(II) Require, within five minutes after determining it is
Page 8, Line 8necessary or advisable, the mechanical isolation of critical
Page 8, Line 9components if or when a coronal mass ejection is likely to cause geomagnetically induced currents; and
Page 8, Line 10(III) Require, when appropriate, restricting or closing fuel pipeline valves to mitigate damage in a sectional failure;
Page 8, Line 11(c) Require the installation of automatic neutral ground blocking devices in large power transformers;
Page 8, Line 12(d) Ensure computer equipment can be mechanically
Page 8, Line 13isolated from the grid and sheltered from geomagnetically induced surges;
Page 8, Line 14(e) Require all networked systems that operate
Page 8, Line 15electrical generation and distribution to be electronically and physically separable from the outside networks; and
Page 8, Line 16(f) Require cyber-certification of hardware and software that operate electrical generation and distribution.
Page 8, Line 17SECTION 3. Act subject to petition - effective date. This act
Page 9, Line 1takes effect at 12:01 a.m. on the day following the expiration of the
Page 9, Line 2ninety-day period after final adjournment of the general assembly; except
Page 9, Line 3that, if a referendum petition is filed pursuant to section 1 (3) of article V
Page 9, Line 4of the state constitution against this act or an item, section, or part of this
Page 9, Line 5act within such period, then the act, item, section, or part will not take
Page 9, Line 6effect unless approved by the people at the general election to be held in
Page 9, Line 7November 2026 and, in such case, will take effect on the date of the official declaration of the vote thereon by the governor.