

# POLI 251: American Political Institutions

University of California, San Diego | Fall 2018 | Tuesday 9:00-11:50am | SSB 104  
Updated September 25, 2018

## Prof. Pamela Ban

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This course introduces doctoral students to some of the major themes in American political institutions. It is designed to prepare students for the Institutions portion of the comprehensive exam in the field of American Politics.

## Course Requirements

The most important requirement of the course is to read the assignments for each week carefully and critically before class. They will form the focus of our discussions in class. Be aware that some of your reading of some items will affect your reading of other items in the current week or a future week; we will discuss these links.

1. **Class Participation/Weekly Memos (50%):** To facilitate discussion, each week each student will write a short memo (no more than 400 words) based on the assigned readings. This memo should address one or more of the following questions: (i) What is the most important take-away from the readings? (ii) What issues do the readings raise but not adequately address? That is, what do the readings suggest about promising directions for future research?

You will be responsible for completing and circulating your memo to the class each week. *Each weekly memo will be due by Monday 9:00am, before each Tuesday class*, to ensure that everyone has time to read each other's memos before class. We will circulate memos through a class email list.

In addition: Each week, a pair of students will be responsible for starting the discussion. The pair will prepare a short, 20 minute summary of the readings, together with a few of their own thoughts along the lines of the memos. We will determine the schedule for this during the first class.

2. **Final Paper (50%):** There is much in the American institutions literature that is not represented here. Your final paper for this course will be an analytical literature review and in-class presentation on some aspect of the institutions literature that we did not cover – or did not cover as deep as your own interest – in class. You are encouraged to choose a topic that is related to your own research interests.

A few guidelines: Do not merely restate or summarize what has been done; put an analytical frame on the literature, and use that analytical approach to identify what is known and not known on the given subject. Your paper should be approximately 20 pages in length. This is a good opportunity to start exploring an area of research in which you are interested in working.

## Schedule

The readings under each date are to be completed for that class meeting (and are the readings for the weekly memo due the day before that class).

### October 2 – Introduction; Institutional Foundations

*The Federalist Papers*, Nos. 10, 51, 52.

Wilson, Woodrow. 1885. *Congressional Government*.<sup>1</sup>

### October 9 – Congress: Electoral Foundation

Mayhew, David. *Congress, The Electoral Connection*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Section 1: "The Electoral Incentive."

Rohde, David. 1979. "Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of Members of the United States House of Representatives." *American Journal of Political Science* 23(1): 1-26.

Fenno, Richard. 1977. "U.S. House Members and Their Constituencies." *American Political Science Review* 71(3): 883-917.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart. 2001. "Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1): 136-159.

Jacobson, Gary. 1989. "Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections." *American Political Science Review* 83(3): 773-793.

Gelman, Andrew, and Gary King. 1990. "Estimating the Incumbency Advantage Without Bias." *American Journal of Political Science*. 34" 1142-1164.

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<sup>1</sup>Available at: <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/35861/35861-h/35861-h.htm>

## October 16 – Congress: Organizational Structure

Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Introduction, Chapters 1-3 (p. 1-75).<sup>2</sup>

Weingast, Barry and William Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislators, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets." *Journal of Political Economy* 96(1): 132-163.

Rohde, David and Kenneth Shepsle. 1973. "Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process." *American Political Science Review* 67(3): 889-905.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Chapter 3. <sup>3</sup>

Shepsle, Kenneth and Barry Weingast. 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power." *American Political Science Review* 81(1): 85-104.

Krehbiel, Keith, Kenneth Shepsle, and Barry Weingast. 1987. "Why Are Congressional Committees Powerful?" *American Political Science Review* 81(3): 929-945.

## October 23 – Political Parties

APSA Committee on Political Parties. 1950. "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System." *American Political Science Review* 44: Supplement. Foreword and Summary of Conclusions and Proposals (Parts I-III optional).

Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Chapters 5-7 (p. 99-175).

Aldrich, John. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Snyder, James M., Jr. and Michael M. Ting. 2002. "An Informational Rationale for Political Parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(1): 90-110.

Snyder, James M., Jr. and Tim Groseclose. 2000. "Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(2): 193-211.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. "Where's the Party?" *British Journal of Political Science* 23(2): 235-266.

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<sup>2</sup>Available through UCSD at: <http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft809nb53m/>.

<sup>3</sup>Available through UCSD at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.8850>.

## October 30 – The Presidency

Neustadt, Richard. 1960. *Presidential Power*. Chapters 1-5.<sup>4</sup>

Howell, William G. 2003. *Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1-3.<sup>5</sup>

Canes-Wrone, Brandice and Scott de Marchi. 2002. "Presidential Approval and Legislative Success." *Journal of Politics* 64: 491-509.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2001. "The President's Legislative Influence from Public Appeals." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(2): 313-329.

Moe, Terry. 1985. "The Politicized Presidency" in Chubb and Peterson, *The New Direction in American Politics*, p. 235-272.

## November 6 – The Bureaucracy

Wilson, James Q. 1989. *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*. Chapters 1, 2, 6, 9, 10, 17.

Moe, Terry. 1989. "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure," in Chubb and Peterson, *Can the Government Govern?* The Brookings Institution, p. 267-329.<sup>6</sup>

Lewis, David E. 2007. "Testing Pendleton's Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse Bureaucrats?" *Journal of Politics* 69(4): 1073-1088.

Shipan, Charles. 2004. "Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional Nature of Political Influence." *American Political Science Review* 98(3): 467-480.

Clinton, Joshua, David Lewis, and Jennifer Selin. 2014. "Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(2): 387-401.

## November 13 – Executive-Congressional Relations

Cameron, Charles. 2001. *Veto Bargaining*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1-2.<sup>7</sup>

Lee, Frances. 2008. "Dividers, Not Unifiers: Presidential Leadership and Senate Partisanship, 1981-2004." *Journal of Politics* 70: 914-928.

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<sup>4</sup>Available through UCSD at: <https://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.presidents/prdtpwr0001&collection=presidents>.

<sup>5</sup>Available through UCSD at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt15hvxnf>.

<sup>6</sup>Available at: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/247947716\\_The\\_Politics\\_of\\_Bureaucratic\\_Structure](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/247947716_The_Politics_of_Bureaucratic_Structure).

<sup>7</sup>Available through UCSD at: <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/veto-bargaining/F174085E5D19AFF678FDAD2F58129341>.

McCubbins, Mathew and Schwartz, Thomas. 1984. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms." *American Journal of Political Science* 28(1): 165-179.

Kriner, Douglas and Andrew Reeves. 2015. "Presidential Particularism and Divide-the-Dollar Politics." *American Political Science Review* 109(1): 155-171.

Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Mathew McCubbins. 1988. "Presidential Influence in the Appropriations Process." *American Journal of Political Science* 32(3): 713-736

Howell, William and Jon Rogowski. 2013. "War, the Presidency, and Legislative Voting Behavior." *American Journal of Political Science* 57(1): 150-166.

### **November 20 – Courts**

Dahl, Robert. 1957. "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National Policy Maker." *Journal of Public Law* 6: 279-295.

Whittington, Keith. 2005. "Interpose Your Friendly Hand': Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court." *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 583-596.

Segal, Jeffrey A., Charles M. Cameron, and Albert D. Cover. 1992. "A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations." *American Journal of Political Science* 36(1): 96-121.

Anderson, Robert and Alexander Tahk. 2007. "Institutions and Equilibrium in the United States Supreme Court." *American Political Science Review* 101(4): 811-825.

Nelson, Michael, and Alicia Uribe-McGuire. 2017. "Opportunity and Overrides: The Effect of Institutional Public Support on Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Decisions." *Political Research Quarterly* 70(3): 632-643.

### **November 27 – Interest Groups and Lobbying**

Austen-Smith, David. 1993. "Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes." *American Journal of Political Science* 37(3): 799-833.

Hall, Richard L. and Alan V. Deardorff. 2006. "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy." *American Political Science Review* 100(1): 69-84.

Romer, Thomas and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1994. "An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of PAC Contributions." *American Journal of Political Science* 38(3): 745-769.

Blanes I Vidal, Jordi, Mirko Draca, and Christian Fons-Rosen. 2012. "Revolving Door Lobbyists." *American Economic Review* 102(7): 3731-3748.

Bertrand, Marianne, Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi. 2015. "Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process." *American Economic Review* 104(12): 3885-3920.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, John M. de Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 2003. "Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17(1): 105-130.

Yackee, Jason Webb and Susan Webb Yackee. 2006. "A Bias toward Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the Bureaucracy." *Journal of Politics* 68(1): 128-139.

**December 4 – Literature Reviews Due; Student Presentations**