

**POLI 10**  
**INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN (U.S.) POLITICS**  
**Spring 2012**  
**Lectures MW 10-10:50 Center Hall 101**

*Note: minor changes may be made to this syllabus throughout the quarter (particularly the order of the statistics readings/presentations). You are responsible for any changes mentioned in class, even if you are absent. Changes will also be posted on TED.*

**Peter F. Galderisi**

**Office Hours:** SSB 449 Tuesday, 12-3 (W 2-4 for non class hours)

**Email:** For *class related* questions—use the message (not email) facility in TED for this course

For *other, non course related questions:* [pgalderisi@ucsd.edu](mailto:pgalderisi@ucsd.edu)

--please feel free to message me with questions/concerns at any time. I will check them at least every *early* evening (and usually throughout the day), except Saturdays (my one day with my wife).

**TA Assignments:**

TA	Office	Hours	Sections
Hans Hassell	SSB 323	Th 10-11 aba	A04 Th 9-9:50 WLH 2208 A07 F 10-10:50 U 413-1
Scott Lucas	SSB 341	W 3-5	A06 F 9-9:50 HSS 1128A A08 F 10-10:50 HSS 1128A
Paul Schuler	SSB 326	W 1-3	A01 W 12-12:50 HSS 2150 A05 Th 3-3:50 U 413-2
Jaime Settle	SSB 323	T 11-12 W 2-3 TBA	A02 W 1-1:50 HSS 2150 A03 W 3-3:50 HSS 2150

**COURSE OVERVIEW**

Concentrating on the different formal and informal channels through which the American public can influence the decision-making process (and in turn be influenced by it), we will study the major governmental institutions' ability to represent the needs and demands of an increasingly varied constituency. We will emphasize that processes and outcomes are not always predictably related, or, in the least, are not related in ways that we would have preferred. Democratic processes, for example, do not always give us the outcomes we desire--a fact not lost on the Framers of the U.S. Constitution (or the current electorate).

Throughout the course we will attempt to integrate our knowledge of political processes and outcomes into an analysis of current political events. Politics and government, however, cannot be competently understood at one point in time, even during a potentially transformative election season. Since we must know where we have been to understand where we are going, we will also review the major changes that have transformed the U.S. political universe from its humble Constitutional beginnings into its present complicated, adversarial and polarized state. We will also come to understand that much of what is in evidence today is a continuation of our past. Battles between nationalists and states rights advocates, a lack of trust in government, and consternation over Supreme Court decisions have always been part of U.S. political culture.

## COURSE OBJECTIVES

1. To learn to think
2. To learn to think about U.S. politics
3. To learn to organize and articulate those thoughts
4. To learn that politics, just like life generally, is complex with few easy answers or solutions (for those, you can turn to cable news)

## CLASS FORMAT

Most of the class time will be taken up by my lectures (a necessary function of the class size). Discussion sessions will allow for (and will be formatted to accommodate) more open discussion. Students can, of course, raise their hands to ask a question at any time during the lecture. Please understand, however, that given the number of students in the class, I may have to limit how many questions I entertain (particularly from any one or two persons). Particularly, I will not allow the class to turn into an ongoing debate about any particular current politician, election, local issue, court decision, corporate bonuses, etc.. Please contact me during office hours or by email if you have questions that could not be answered during class.

## REQUIREMENTS

1a. One text, available at the campus bookstore, is required for this course: *The Logic of American Politics* (5<sup>th</sup> ed.) by Kernell, Jacobson and Kousser, available at the campus bookstore.

1b. You will also need to purchase a reader from University Readers that will contain several lengthy essays to be reviewed for section discussion. Please keep in mind that our institution adheres to copyright law, so any copyrighted material should not be copied or duplicated in any manner.

To purchase the reader, please follow the instructions below:

Step 1: Log on to <https://students.universityreaders.com/store/>.

Step 2: Create an account or log in if you have an existing account to purchase.

Step 3: Easy-to-follow instructions will guide you through the rest of the ordering process. Payment can be made by all major credit cards or with an electronic check.

Step 4: After purchasing, you can access your full or partial e-book (FREE 30% PDF) by logging into your account and clicking **My Digital Materials** to get started on your readings right away.

You should also be shown an option to purchase the reader entirely in e-book format, although the cost difference is minimal (\$3+ no shipping).

Orders are typically processed within 24 hours and the shipping time will depend on the selected shipping method and day it is shipped (orders are not shipped on Sundays or holidays). If you experience any difficulties, please email [orders@universityreaders.com](mailto:orders@universityreaders.com) or call 800.200.3908 ext. 503.

1c. In addition, several other essays, court cases, commentaries, etc. of various lengths will be required and will be available online directly or through the UCSD library server (access on campus or at home through a proxy server—these will be marked with an \*). The TAs will explain this process during sections the first week.

1d. I will also post occasional 'thought' pages to help with organizing the readings or focus on a handful of topics. My hope is that these will get you to think beyond the course material. The first two "discussions" are attached to this syllabus as is an outline for what to concentrate on in the text.

All readings serve as background to the lectures and discussions. Readings should therefore be completed in advance of the corresponding class lectures and section discussions.

2. Lectures will run in a logical sequence. Missing the first lecture of a sequence will often lead to confusion later on. **Attendance is therefore extremely important.** If you can't make it on time, on a regular basis, **please** drop the class. Class time is for lecture, discussion, taking notes, and learning about the course material. It is not for reading newspapers, surfing the web, catching up on sleep, studying for other exams, answering cell phones\*, or talking with your classmates. Not only is such behavior rude, it tends to distract other members of the class, thereby making it more difficult for them to learn. It will also **not be tolerated.** Please respect the lecturer and your fellow students. All of us are trying to concentrate on the material. I will be especially ticked off if I notice anyone using their laptops for other than taking notes. Several law schools (believe it or not) have been forced to place internet blockers in their classrooms. Please don't force us to begin that policy.

\* Please notify the professor if an exception, due to a potential emergency situation, must be made.

3. Discussion section—each of you has been assigned a time and place to meet for discussions led by your TA. These **are not** optional. Attendance will be taken and 1 point will be deducted for missing each section for other than an excused absence as defined by university policy.

4. Exams, Assignments, Grading:

a. Midterm: Wednesday, May 9, in class (25% of total)—short essays (format to be discussed in class)

b. A short, 3-5 page take-home assignment due by the **beginning** of class, Wednesday, May 23 (25% of total). The topic for that assignment will be posted Wednesday, May 16. Because this is a take-home, we will expect a more polished performance than we expect for an in-class essay. Late assignments will not be accepted without penalty (10% after the beginning of class, 10% the next day, 10% each additional day).

c. Final: Monday, June 11, 8-10:59 room TBA (40% of total)—short essays covering second half of class, one final, cumulative essay. **No early final** will be given so please adjust your travel accordingly. If you cannot make this date, please drop this class.

d. **Section attendance and participation** (10% of total)

#### FINAL GRADE DISTRIBUTION:

A few A+ grades will be also be given to the top students in class and sections.

A	≥94	C+	77-79
A-	90-93	C	74-76
B+	87-89	C-	70-73
B	84-86	D	60-69
B-	80-83	F	below 60

#### POLICY ON CHEATING AND PLAGIARISM

The death penalty--no exceptions! The current U.S. Supreme Court will back me up on this. Enough said.

##### **PLAGIARISM:**

Plagiarism is the intentional use of another's words (by direct transcription) or ideas (by paraphrasing) without attribution. University prohibitions against plagiarism are rather clear. If you are not sure about the meaning of plagiarism, please ask me to clarify or go to the link below.

##### **CHEATING:**

Failure--no exceptions. "Cheating" includes working together on the midterm or final exam questions. You can help each other with general questions about basic concepts, facts, readings, lectures, citation style, etc. In fact, I strongly suggest you do so on a regular basis. On the other hand, collaborating on the final essay or paper themselves, either in preparation or final production, is strictly forbidden. If you are not sure about the distinction, please ask me to clarify.

Further information on violations of university academic integrity codes can be found at:

<http://students.ucsd.edu/academics/academic-integrity/consequences.html>

## **POLICY ON WHINING**

See "policy on cheating and plagiarism."

## **ROLE OF THE PROFESSOR AND THE TEACHING ASSISTANTS**

The professor is responsible for course organization, lectures, oversight of the grading process, and assignment of final grades. General questions about course material, concepts, lectures, and why Duke lost to should be directed to the professor. The teaching assistants are mainly responsible for overseeing discussion sections, grading, preparing for and reviewing exams with students, and assisting with class logistics.

## **A NOTE ON GRADING:**

Any request for a grade review must be made to your TA in writing (typed) with a full explanation of why you are requesting the review *no sooner* than 24 hours after the midterm or take home assignment is returned, and no later than one week after. An appeal of that review can be made to the professor. Note that any review may result in a higher or lower grade (or no change).

## **REQUESTS FOR MAKE UPS, ETC.**

Make ups or extensions on due dates can only be granted if you have and can document a legitimate, university approved reason. These include university sponsored travel, deaths in family, illnesses, etc. Again, university rules require that I have documentation for this. We'll discuss bureaucracies later in class.

Incompletes can only be given to those with a valid, certified reason, and passable work *before* the final.

## **CLASS WEB PAGE**

Changes to this syllabus, as well as any review guides, assignments, section discussion questions, emails, or date changes will be posted on the class web page (TED). Please check it on a daily basis. Your TAs will review its use in section this week.

## SCHEDULE:

I never give *exact* dates for each topic or reading (more on that in class). I will let you know where you need to be at the end of each class. The following is meant as a general, weekly guideline. More detailed descriptions of what will be discussed in section will be posted on the class TED page as the class progresses. An \* denotes that you can only access the essay on campus or at home through a proxy server. Entries without an \* can be directly accessed online.

### Week 1 Introduction: Democracy, Representation and Power

Kernell, Jacobson and Kousser (KJK), Chapter 1, Chapter 15 (review briefly; all concepts will be covered as the class progresses)  
Get ahead—start week 2 readings

*Discussion section: Class logistics and the prisoner's dilemma*

### Week 2 The Constitutional Rules of the Game

KJK, Chapter 2  
the U.S. Constitution (Appendix in KJK)  
Federalist #51 (Appendix)  
Daniel Lazare, "The Frozen Republic" selections (University Reader)  
\*Martin Diamond (1959), "Democracy and the Federalist" *The American Political Science Review*  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1951730>

*Discussion section: The Constitution as instrument of democracy or risk aversion*

### Week 3 The Changing Constitutional Regime: the Nationalization of Power

A: KJK, Chapter 9, Chapter 4, section on *Brown v. Bd.* only  
*Brown v. Bd. of Education* (1954) [http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\\_CR\\_0347\\_0483\\_ZO.html](http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0347_0483_ZO.html)

B: Federalism and the changing landscape of the distribution of power

KJK, Chapter 3  
Federalist #10 (Appendix)  
*McCulloch v. Maryland* (1819) [http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\\_CR\\_0017\\_0316\\_ZO.html](http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0017_0316_ZO.html)  
*Gibbons v. Ogden* (1824) [http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\\_CR\\_0022\\_0001\\_ZO.html](http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0022_0001_ZO.html)  
*U.S. v Lopez* (1995)  
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/search/display.html?terms=lopez&url=/supct/html/93-1260.ZS.html> \*\*\*

*Discussion section: the national sovereignty/states rights balance*

### Week 4 The Right to Participate - Civil Liberties and Rights

KJK, Chapter 4, Chapter 5  
*Griswold v. Connecticut* (1965) [http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\\_CR\\_0381\\_0479\\_ZO.html](http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0381_0479_ZO.html) \*\*\*  
*Texas v. Johnson* (1989) [http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\\_CR\\_0491\\_0397\\_ZS.html](http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0491_0397_ZS.html) \*\*\*

*Discussion section: exam review*

\*\*\*Contemporary (1960s on) court cases can run over 100 pages. Skim through the material. Make sure you read the summary (syllabus), major opinion and at least one dissenting opinion.

**MIDTERM—Wednesday, May 23, in class (please bring blue exam books)**

## **Week 5 Introduction to Participation, Public Opinion and the Electoral Process**

KJK, Chapter 10, Chapter 11 (491-501)

Geoffrey Baym, "John Stewart, Brian Williams, and Ted Koppel's Giant Head" (UR)

Stephen Wayne, "Popular Base of American Electoral Politics" (UR)

\*Michael McDonald (2008), "The return of the voter" (*the Forum*) (go to 'Full Text PDF')

[http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/for.2009.6.4\\_20120105083454/for.2009.6.4/for.2009.6.4.1278/for.2009.6.4.1278.xml?format=INT](http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/for.2009.6.4_20120105083454/for.2009.6.4/for.2009.6.4.1278/for.2009.6.4.1278.xml?format=INT)

Keeter and Tyson (2008), "Young voters in the 2008 election" (Pew Research Center)

<http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1031/young-voters-in-the-2008-election>

\*Michael McDonald (2010), "Voter turnout in the 2010 midterm elections" (*the Forum*) (go to 'Full Text PDF')

[http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/for.2011.8.4\\_20120105083457/for.2011.8.4/for.2011.8.4.1406/for.2011.8.4.1406.xml?format=INT](http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/for.2011.8.4_20120105083457/for.2011.8.4/for.2011.8.4.1406/for.2011.8.4.1406.xml?format=INT)

*Discussion section: Low turnout and U.S. elections--who votes and why*

## **Weeks 6-7 Parties and the Electoral Process**

KJK, Chapter 12, Chapter 14 (skim), Chapter 11 (remainder)

Barry Burden, "The Nominations" (UR)

James Fallows (2008), "Rhetorical questions" (*Atlantic Monthly Online*)

<http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200809/fallows-debates>

*Discussion sections: understanding parties and the electoral process--nominations and campaign finance,*

## **Week 8 Interest Group Politics**

KJK, Chapter 13

Marion Nestle, "Influencing Government" (UR)

*Discussion section: interest groups, democracy, and representation*

## **Week 9 Congress: The People's Branch or Dysfunctional Mess?**

KJK, Chapter 6

Mayer and Canon (1999), "Why Don't We Like Congress?" (UR)

Anthony King (1997), "Running Scared" (*Atlantic Monthly Online*)

<http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/97jan/scared/scared.htm>

*Discussion section: does Congress represent?*

## **Week 10 The President: Clark Kent, Superman, Peter Griffin, or None (All) of the Above?**

KJK, Chapter 7

Bruce Miroff, "The Presidential Spectacle" (UR)

*Discussion section: Expectations and the Modern Presidency*

*A final review will be scheduled for the entire class.*

## POLI 10-SPRING 2012

This handout, and the ones that follow, are intended to highlight interesting "thought questions" which unite different chapters in the textbook. These guides are not intended to be comprehensive reviews of the important material; rather, they should guide your thinking about important themes in the design, structure and function of the American political system.

### Sections 1 and 2

#### **General Theme 1: The Process of Achieving Democratic Outcomes**

##### 1. Key Concepts

Read over the first chapter, but don't get weighed down with the heavy conceptualization. We will return to most points in subsequent chapters. Concentrate on understanding the commons dilemma, free rider problems, transaction vs. conformity costs, and voting rules.

##### 2. "Majority Rule" and Its Alternatives

Consider that "majority rule" is not the only way to achieve democratic outcomes. Some would argue that the complicated nature of the Constitution was meant to elevate public opinion so that outcomes would be more acceptable, or at least beneficial to most citizens. This notion of "consensus," as difficult as it is to achieve, can be fostered by voting rules, including the original rules that governed the selection of the president by the Electoral College. Before the ratification of the 12th Amendment, each elector was:

- expected to act as an independent thinker who would attempt to select a president--the one person who represents the entire nation--who would be the best national leader.
- in order to accommodate this, the Framers gave each elector 2 separate votes for President, i.e., they could choose two individuals whom they felt were acceptable choices. The hope was that most electors would give one of their two equal votes to the same individual--thus achieving consensus within the group.

In order to understand the difference between simple majority rule and other approaches, consider this example. (Actually, most U.S. elections are decided by plurality rule--the one who receives the most votes wins even if it is below 50%--the majority threshold). Let us say that there is a choice among three candidates and that we could discern the preference schedules of each voter.

Although six combinations are possible, let me lay out three. Candidate A would receive 45% of the vote if, as in most elections, you were only granted one vote. Candidate B would receive 30%, and candidate C the remaining 25%. Let us assume that, if we could determine each voter's second and third preference, the following would be demonstrated:

	45%	30%	25%
1st choice	A	B	C
2nd choice	C	C	B
3rd choice	B	A	A

Now, in a standard (plurality) election, 'A' would be the winner as he/she received a higher percentage of the vote than anyone else. But notice that 'A' is the last choice (maybe despised) of a majority (55%). OK, let's force a majority. Usually, in states that require such, the candidate with the fewest votes is dropped. That would be 'C.' Assuming that individuals would then vote their second choice if their first were eliminated, then 'B' would gain 'C's 25% support and be declared the winner. But 'B' is the last (perhaps despised) choice of 45% of the electorate. Might it be the case that 'C' is the most acceptable choice although he would be eliminated under standard plurality or majority rules? Under the original electoral college voting standard, C would be the winner.

As you read through the discussion of the Constitution, consider that the issue of whether or not it follows democratic guidelines depends upon your definition of 'democratic'--plurality, majority, or consensus? The article by Martin Diamond considers that the Framers were trying to achieve 'deliberative democracy', part of which attempts to reach consensus rather than simple majority choice. I included it as a counterpart to the essay by Lazare.

#### **General Theme-2: Flexibility and the Constitution**

Where do we start? The Constitution is such a central part of our political process that a short rendition would do it an injustice. Instead, I will just introduce a few basic themes, pose what I find to be some difficult subject matter for thought, and offer a series of further readings that illuminate the development of the Constitution.

## 1. Flexibility in the Constitution: Informal and Formal Constitutional Changes

A. Formally, the Constitution can be changed by amendment, but only 17 amendments have been added to the original Bill of Rights. (Actually the 27<sup>th</sup> Amendment was part of the original list proposed with the Bill of Rights, and the 21<sup>st</sup> cancels out the 18<sup>th</sup>!). Going back to our notion of democracy by consensus, we can see that, in general, the numbers are stacked against any amendment that is faced with concentrated opposition. Obviously, the Framers wanted these formal, institutional changes (amendments) to be difficult unless broadly acceptable (as was the original Constitution).

*Here's an exercise that you might want to try:*

*Given the 2/3rds (proposal) and 3/4ths (ratification) numbers, what is the minimal proportion of individuals that are represented by enough Senators to prevent an amendment from being officially proposed (assume that senators from the same state vote alike)? Translation: What is the proportion of the total U.S. population residing in the 17 least populated states? Their 34 Senators can prevent an Amendment from being officially proposed. Given disparities in populations, it's much less than  $1/3 + 1$ . Then, what would be the minimal proportion that would be represented by state legislatures? Again, it's much less than  $1/4 + 1$  because of population disparities (least populated 13). Some states require a 2/3rds majority for ratification, and this brings the proportion even further down. My recollection might be off, but if every state had had a simple majority, rather than supermajority rule for ratification, the Equal Rights Amendment would have been ratified.*

## B. Informal change—change through interpretation

Most of the “living and growing” nature of the Constitution has not come by amendments, but by the decisions of those in power—Court interpretations, congressional legislation, bureaucratic implementation, etc. From the beginning of the Republic, it has been tied to how those in power viewed their Constitutional responsibilities and what they got away with. We can start the discussion now, but, obviously, this is the subject matter of the rest of the class.

A few examples are noteworthy. The veto power is certainly a part of the Constitution's system of checks and balances. How far should this power go? Should it be used sparingly and only in extreme instances (my view of what the Framers intended), or a political instrument to be used by Presidents against congresses controlled by the opposition (or as FDR demonstrated, more radical elements of his own party) purely on the basis of policy disagreements? The Constitution only mentions the logistics of the power—not *when* it should be exercised. This poses an important question—what was most important in the Framers' mind? Separation of powers (and the president leaves the Congress the role of writing legislation), checks and balances (and the

president serves as a 3<sup>rd</sup> legislative branch), or an ill-defined coupling of the two? Another example is brought up by interpretation of the Commerce Clause, written at a time when most “commerce” was localized (more on this in the Federalism section).

*Question: How much should a president control the political agenda through his veto and general legislative powers? Should a lame duck president be allowed to reestablish his relevance in the last months of his presidency through a broad use of that veto power, or, as with President Bush, fade into the sunset in his last months in office?*

## 2. Flexibility and politics

This is a touchy subject with many. The major “flexibility” in the Constitution comes by way of its vagueness (what, e.g., is “necessary and proper,” an amendment's prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment,” etc.). One could argue that vagueness is the essence of compromise—everyone can read into it what they wish. An original Constitution with too many specific clauses would probably have lost support by helping to organize a “majority of minorities”—separate, concentrated groups opposed to a particular section or clause.

The touchy part is trying to reconcile this “political” aspect of the writing of the Constitution with the assumption (which is really part of American folklore, not just several religious denominations' religious philosophy) that the Constitution was “divinely inspired.” I choose not to question this assumption—religion and cultural beliefs are personal. But think about it this way. Even if the Framers were inspired by a higher entity, the document, in order to be ratified, had to be sold to a bunch of heathens, i.e., the post-revolutionary citizenry—thus, the need for political maneuvering. Even amendments are vague, and many classic court battles have emerged over disagreements about intent and meaning.

*Question: Why was it necessary to “sell” this document? Remember: the Federalist Papers were in part a fleshing out of the limited document, but they were also public relation essays meant to garner support in the old colonies, particularly New York. Can we go too far in using them as realistic appraisals of the true meaning of the Constitution?*



## Interesting Supplementary Readings

I could go on for hours, but you have better things to do. Allow me to suggest some of my favorite readings about Constitutional origins and development.

Forrest MacDonald (1985), *Novos Ordo Seclorum*: not the easiest read, but a good overview of the intellectual origins of the Constitution. It's a standard in many upper-division and graduate classes.

Martin Diamond (1981), *the Founding of the Democratic Republic*: an easier read, perhaps more in line with conservative views, Diamond discusses the notion of "deliberative democracy"—the sifting process of the separate institutions and how the Constitution attempted to create outcomes that would be reached by consensus (although he doesn't use my exact words).

James Sterling Young (1966), *the Washington Community*: in my mind, one of the best books to be written by a political scientist (who fortunately does not write like a political scientist). In this political anthropology, Young discusses how the outlines of governance created by the Constitutional document were carried out by policymakers in the newly built (in a swamp) Washington, D.C.—both geographically and philosophically. I strongly recommend it as way of transitioning from the document to modern U.S. governance.

Wirls & Wirls (2004), *the Invention of the U.S. Senate*: a well-written exposition that combines theoretical elements from all of the above. Although focusing on the Senate, the Wirls brothers use that institution as a springboard to discuss Constitutional development generally.

## What to concentrate on in the text:

### Chapter 1:

What is a *prisoner's dilemma* and why might it hamper achieving choices that best accommodate each political point of view? What role does trust play in how this dilemma plays out? Why might governmental action be necessary to force "mutual cooperation."?

What is a *free rider problem*? Why might individuals, if given the choice, not directly support through contributions (taxes) policies that they believe will actually benefit them? Again, what is the role of government in trying to moderate this problem?

What is the *tragedy of the commons*? How does it tie in with the free rider problem? How can *regulation* and *privitization* help to prevent this tragedy?

What are *transaction costs*? In what way is the Constitutional amendment process an example of government (the Framers) purposely increasing transaction costs? What are *conformity costs*? In what ways do the two types of costs often involve a tradeoff?

What are the differences among plurality rule, *majority rule*, and *super majoritarianism* including *unanimous consent*? What are institutional examples of each? In what ways does our Constitutional design reflect each form of rule making?

(the rest will be covered in later chapters)

### Chapter 2:

Following on the last item from Chapter 1, what form of voting rule was generally applied under the *Articles of Confederation*? How did this rule help to exacerbate free rider and commons problems?

How would U.S. government been configured differently under the *Virginia Plan* and the *New Jersey Plan*? Which components of each were included in the *Great Compromise*?

Dr. G.'s note: *delegate support for the Virginia Plan and New Jersey Plan was not solely based upon the size of the population in each state. Many states (like New York) were basing their support on future population projections (Wiris & Wiris, 2004). Delegates also differed as to their views about the national government's proper role--representing people or defending property rights?*

What are the different rules that govern *apportionment* (number of members) for each state to the U.S. House, U.S. Senate, and the *Electoral College* (see also Topic Guide handed out previously)? How might these rules skew the influence of individual states?

What are the major Constitutional provisions for *separation of powers* and *checks and balances*. Make sure you can give examples of each. What is the purpose of each? How might they be in conflict with each other?

Dr. G.'s note: *Not only did the Framers split Constitutionally derived authority among the three branches, they also provided a system that would elevate national actors through different means. Only members of the U.S. House are directly elected by the "people" (defined rather narrowly in the 18th Century). Senators were, until a Constitutional amendment changed this, chosen by their state legislatures (who, in turn, were elected by the people). Presidents were (and still are officially) chosen by a group of electors (at first independent--see previous handout), chosen by state legislators (who, in turn...). The national judiciary is chosen by the president, with consent of the senate, each chosen... (see above). Not only was each branch (and I'll consider the house and senate to be different branches) most proximately accountable to a different group of individuals (people, legislators, electors, presidents), but they could not be replaced all at once (short of revolution). Terms of office among the elected branches are not only different (house members =2, senators=6, presidents=4) but they are staggered (in 2010, for example, all 435 house seats were up for grabs but only 1/3rd of the senate seats, and not the president). It takes three electoral cycles (because of the senate) to replace everyone in office through electoral means (in the early Republic, many house and senate members resigned before their terms were up--Young, 1966). National court justices, including members of the Supreme Court (SCOTUS) are appointed for life (more on this in another quiz section). Part of the logic of Constitutional selection was not only meant to prevent change all at once by simple majorities of citizens, but was also intended to separate many officials from direct popular influence. Madison describes this as not necessarily undemocratic, but as a way to "enhance and enlarge" upon popular views by elevating the best, brightest and most nationally conscious individuals to office.*

What are the requirements for *amending* (formally) the Constitution. Why (both in logic and numbers) is it so difficult to do so? Does the amendment process conform more to rule by majority or rule by consensus?

What were the major differences between *Federalist and Anti-Federalist philosophies*, especially in terms of direct popular rule, the nature of representation, and the size of government?

What are the major arguments put forward by *Federalist #10*. What did Madison see as the benefit of a larger polity over a smaller one (*size principle*)?

What are the major arguments put forward by *Federalist #51*? How do those arguments join with those in *Federalist #10* in promoting a system with high transaction costs, but with limits on majority or minority tyranny?