

INTL 190: Urban Politics
Course Syllabus, Winter Quarter 2021

Tuesdays and Thursdays, 09:30am-10:50am
(zoom link on Canvas)

Maria Carreri
mcarreri@ucsd.edu

OH Monday 09:00am-10:00am (sign-up on google sheet [here](#))

Course Description

It is an exciting time to study local politics! In the age of partisan polarization and gridlock in Congress, city governments in the U.S. are emerging as a form of government at the forefront of policy change and innovation. Moreover, local elected offices are increasingly being created or strengthened throughout the developing world. Finally, with the rise of computational social science, field experiments and causal inference, much of cutting-edge political economy research is becoming local in nature and turning to city governments to take advantage of micro data and opportunities for quasi-experimental designs.

This course will introduce you to the study of local politics in the U.S. and abroad. **The focus on this class will be on politics rather than policies: we will focus on how local political institutions and political selection at the local level affect the balance of power and, ultimately, the policies adopted.** The first part of the course will focus on U.S. Municipal government and study their impact on the day-to-day of citizens. We will explore city policies and their limits, the impulse toward reform of city governments in the U.S., the effects of reform efforts on the distribution of power in and across communities, and how different local political institution (electoral rule, form of government, election timing, rules governing bureaucratic hiring) shape voters participation and representation in the political process. The second part of the course will explore local governments in a comparative perspective, with a focus on developing countries.

Throughout, one goal of the course will be to help you familiarize and become informed consumers of state-of-the-art quantitative research in urban politics and local political economy.

At the end of the course students will produce a research paper exploring a topic of choice in local politics.

Final Papers

Each student will submit an individual project: 15 pages original research project. The purpose of the project is to expand on one of the topics covered in class with a critical literature review.

Course Format

Classes are discussion-based. Readings are mandatory and are to be completed before each class. The last two classes will be devoted to presentations of final projects.

Grading

Final Paper: 40%

Attendance and Participation: 60%

- **Synchronous participation:** participation to class discussion (revolving around questions on syllabus) and one short presentation of an assigned reading
- **Asynchronous alternative:** 2-page response paper to questions on syllabus (due via email before class) Response papers should be titled “GPPS419_YourSurname_monthday” (example: “GPPS419_Carreri_January12”) and one short presentation of an assigned reading (pre-recorded and submitted via email ahead of class – will be shown during class).

Note: if you are a “synchronous student” but find yourself unable to attend one class because of unforeseen circumstances and would like to earn participation points, you can submit a 2-page response paper. The paper will be due 24 hours after the class you missed.

Zoom policy

Students are expected to participate synchronously if possible and have their camera turned on (unless you requested a FERPA protection or do not have a working camera – email me at mcarreri@ucsd.edu by the end of the first week of classes if this applies to you). Please have your full name on your zoom screen and your preferred name (if any) in parentheses [example: Maria (Mary) Carreri].

Please email me (mcarreri@ucsd.edu) by the end of the first week of classes if your circumstances (because of geographic location or connectivity issues) will force you to attend asynchronously for the quarter.

All classes will be recorded and recordings will be posted on Canvas 24 hours after the class.

Course Materials

The textbook City Politics (9th edition), by Judd and Swanstrom, is required and available at the bookstore. All other readings will be posted to Canvas.

Academic Integrity:

Cheating, plagiarism, and other forms of academic dishonesty will not be tolerated and will be subject to disciplinary action consistent with University rules and regulations. All final papers will be submitted through Canvas. Students are welcome to write their course paper on a subject on which they have worked previously, but any students doing so will be asked to turn in the previous version of their paper at the beginning of the quarter and will be graded based on the additional content of the paper generated during the course of the quarter.

Course Outline

Class 1 (Jan 5): Class Presentation and Overview

- No readings

Class 2 (Jan 7): City Limits?

- Peterson, Paul E., *City Limits* (p. 3-4; 15-16; 29-38)
- Ferreira, Fernando, and Joseph Gyourko (2009) “Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from U.S. Cities,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124 (1): 399-422.
- Gerber, Elisabeth R., and Daniel J. Hopkins (2011) “When Mayors Matter: Estimating the Impact of Mayoral Partisanship on City Policy,” *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (2): 36-339.

Reading Guide/Questions for discussion:

- Why does Peterson write that “cities are limited”? What does the Tiebout Model say (based on what we learn in Peterson)? What are the assumptions of the model? What are the consequences for the types of policies that can/cannot be enacted at the local level?
- Do Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) find support in the data for the Tiebout/Peterson hypothesis?
- What does Gerber and Hopkins (2011) show about the Tiebout/Peterson hypothesis? This paper proposes an additional explanation that centers on accountability and federalism: can you identify it? What is the main difference between the two papers? Can this difference explain the results?

Class 3 (Jan 12): Early Days of City Politics

- Judd, Dennis R., and Todd Swanstrom, *City Politics* (chapter 2)
- Dahl, Robert A., *Who Governs?* (p.1-8; 11-17; 20-24; 25-62; 85-86)

Reading Guide/Questions for discussion:

- What is the link between the economics structure of American society and political inequality according to Dahl? What are the main phases?
- Did the rise of industrial society eradicate political inequality? Was the process affected by changes in political institutions as well?
- Is there political equality in the pluralist system?
- What role did immigration play? What is the link between immigration and the limited city?
- What role did city policies like transportation play?

Class 4 (Jan 14): Machines – good or bad?

- Judd, Dennis R., and Todd Swanstrom, *City Politics* (chapter 3)
- Stone, Clarence (1996), “Urban Political Machines: Taking Stock,” *PS: Political Science and Politics*.
- Rioran, William L., *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall. A Series of Very Plain Talks on Very Practical Politics*. (Introduction; Preface; ch1, ch3, ch4, ch9, ch12) **[Shaobo]**

Reading Guide/Questions for discussion:

- Identify pros and cons of political machines?
- What role did immigrant voters play in political machines?
- Were immigrant voters better or worse off because of political machines? Why?
- What motivates Plunkitt’s hatred of the Civil Service Reform?

Class 5 (Jan 19): Reform

- Judd, Dennis R., and Todd Swanstrom, *City Politics* (chapter 4)
- Ornaghi, Arianna, “Civil Service Reform. Evidence from U.S. Police Departments,” Working Paper. [Atziri]

Reading Guide/Questions for discussion:

- What are the main institutional changes proposed by reformers? What are the intended effects of each of them?
- Under what conditions do at-large and district elections deliver the same electoral result?
- What were the long-term consequences/legacy of the reform?
- What created a fertile environment for reform?
- Did reform kill the machines?
- What does Ornaghi (2019) find regarding the relationship between the civil service system and bureaucratic performance?

Class 6 (Jan 21): Forms of Government - Mayors and City Managers

- ICMA, “Council Manager Form of Government”
- Enikolopov, Ruben (2014) “Politicians, Bureaucrats and Targeted Redistribution,” *Journal of Public Economics*.
- Vlaicu, Razvan, and Alexander Whalley (2016) “Hierarchical Accountability in Government,” *Journal of Public Economics*. **Note: Disregard Section 2 [Anirudh]**
- Bae, Jungah, and Richard Feiock (2013) “Forms of Government and Climate Change Policies in US Cities,” *Urban Studies*. [Natalie]

Reading Guide/Questions for discussion:

- What are the main differences between a Council-Manager and a Mayor-Council form of government? How does the role of the mayor differ between the two systems? What is the role of city managers?
- What reasons can you think of in favour of having an appointed bureaucrat (City Manager) running the government?
- Are politicians more or less likely than bureaucrats to engage in targeted redistribution? Why? How does Enikilopov (2014) test this?
- Do Council-Manager and Mayor-Council governments differ in terms of the policies that they enact? What differences would you expect? What do Razvan and Whalley find? What do Bae and Feiock (2012) find on climate change policies?

Class 7 (Jan 26): Political Power

- Trounstine, Jessica. *Political Monopolies in American Cities. The Rise and Fall of Bosses and Reformers*.
- Folke, Olle, Shigeo Hirano, and Jim Snyder, (2011), “Patronage and Elections in U.S. States,” *American Political Science Review*. [Robert]

Reading Guide/Questions for discussion:

- What do political machines and reform regimes share?
- What are “Political Monopolies”? What are the conditions for the creation of political monopolies? What are the main consequences of political monopolies?
- Does control of patronage jobs increase a political party’s chances of winning an election? How does Folke, Hirano, and Snyder (2011) test this question? What do they find? What alternative channels do they explore?

Class 8 (Jan 28): Elections

- Hankinson, Michael, and Asya Magazinnik (2019) “How Electoral Institutions Shape the Efficiency and Equity of Distributive Policy,” Working Paper.
- Anzia, Sarah F. (2011) “Election Timing and the Electoral Influence of Interest Groups,” *Journal of Politics*.
- Hajnal, Zoltan, and Jessica Trounstein (2005) “Why Turnout Does Matter: the consequences of uneven turnout in city politics,” *Journal of Politics*. [Julio]
- Hajnal, Zoltan L. and Paul G. Lewis (2003) “Municipal Institutions and voter Turnout in Local Elections,” *Urban Affairs Review*. [Xiaohui]

Reading Guide/Questions for discussion:

- What are the pros and cons of off-cycle elections? Why is turnout lower in off-cycle elections? Is the effect on turnout homogeneous for all citizens or are there winners and losers from this institution? What kinds of policies are more likely to be enacted in the presence of off-cycle elections? How does Anzia (2011) test this theory? What does she find?
- How does the choice between district and at-large elections affect the equity/efficiency trade-off? What are examples of public goods with concentrated costs and diffuse benefits? How do district elections affect i) the interests of underrepresented groups and ii) the provision of public goods with concentrated costs and diffuse benefits? Why? How do Hankinson and Magazinnik (2019) test this theory? What do they find?
- Which institutions can increase turnout in local elections according to Hajnal and Lewis (2003)?
- What consequences does low turnout in city elections have? How do Hajnal and Trounstein (2005) study this question? What do they find?

Class 9 (Feb 2): Presentation of proposal for Final project

Class 10 (Feb 4): Minority Group Politics I

- Beach, Brian, Daniel B. Jones, Tate Twinam, and Randall Walsh (2018) “Minority Representation in Local Government,” NBER Working Paper.
- Sances, Michael W., and Hye Young You (2017) “Who Pays for Government? Descriptive Representation and Exploitative Revenue Sources,” *Journal of Politics*.
- Rogers, Reuel R. (2004) “Race-Based Coalitions among Minority Groups: Afro-Caribbean Immigrant and African Americans in New York City,” *Urban Affairs Review*. [Aaron]

Reading Guide/Questions for discussion:

- Do minorities benefit from an increase in the number of minority legislators? How do Beach et al answer this question? What outcomes for minority citizens improve with an increase of non-white legislators introduce? Why/How? Under what conditions is this effect strengthened?
- Can descriptive representation to alleviate biases in city policy? How do Sances and You test this claim? What do they find?
- Are race-based coalitions between minority groups rarer than we would expect? Why? What are the possible explanations that emerge from the study of New York City by Rogers?

Class 11 (Feb 9): Minority Group Politics II

- Einstein, Katherine Levine, and David M. Glick (2017) “Does Race Affect Access to Government Services? An Experiment Exploring Street-Level Bureaucrats and Access to Public Housing,” *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Feigenbaum, James, and Andrew B. Hall (2016) “How High-Income areas Receive More Service from Municipal Government: Evidence from City Administrative Data,” Working Paper.
- Giulietti, Corrado, Mirco Tonin, and Michael Vlassopoulos (2019) “Racial Discrimination in Local Public Services: a Field Experiment in the United States,” *Journal of the European Economic Association*. [Taylor]
- de Benedictis-Kessner, Justin (2020) "Where the Sidewalk Ends: How Participation Contributes to Inequity in Government Service Provision. Working Paper [Esmeralda]

Reading Guide/Questions for discussion:

- Do the readings above uncover evidence of discrimination based on race or income in access to public services in the U.S.?
- Do differences in participation explain differences in service provision?

Class 12 (Feb 11): Decentralization: pros and cons

- Bardhan, Pranab (2002) “Decentralization of Governance and Development,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*. Note: read until page 196 only.
- Enikolopov, Ruben, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2003) “Decentralization and Political Institutions,” *Journal of Public Economics*.
- Chacon, Mario (2018) “In the Line of Fire: Political Violence and Decentralization in Colombia,” Working Paper. [Wesley]

Reading Guide/Questions for discussion:

- Before reading the papers due for today, try and think about i) possible pros and cons of decentralization (creating or increasing the powers of local governments) in your opinion, and ii) how these might differ across developed and developing countries.
- What are the main pros and cons of decentralization according to Bardhan? Bardhan suggests that decentralization poses some different issues in the institutional context of developing and transition countries vs, for instance, the U.S. Why?
- If it's important to have more local information, why can't we simply diminish informational asymmetries by having an appointed position from the central government who goes to the local area and collects information?
- Under which conditions does decentralization lead to more efficient governance, better public goods, and higher economic growth according to Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya? What are “externalities from local policies”? What is the rationale behind the hypothesis that strong parties provide political incentives for local politicians to conduct efficient policies?
- What is one of the main threats to the effectiveness of decentralization in war-torn countries according to Chacon (2013)? Why? How does Chacon (2003) test his theory? What does he find?

Class 13 (Feb 16): Political Selection

- Gulzar, Saad, Zuhad Hai, and Binor Kumar Paudel (2019) “Information, Candidate Selection, and the Quality of Representation,” *Journal of Politics*.
- Ferraz, Claudio, and Frederico Finan (2011) “Motivating Politicians. The Impacts of Monetary

Incentives on Quality and Performance,” Working Paper.

- Gulzar, Saad, and Muhammad Yasir Khan (2019) “Political Candidacy and Performance: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan,” Working Paper. [Christopher]
- Brollo, Fernanda, Tommaso Nannicini, Roberto Perotti, and Guido Tabellini (2013) “The Political Resource Curse” *American Economic Review*. [Natalia]

Reading Guide/Questions for discussion:

- How can candidacy of non-elite candidates be encouraged according to Gulzar and Khan (2018)? How do they test their hypothesis?
- Theoretically speaking, why and how would higher wages for politicians increase the quality of policymaking? Will higher wages increase or decrease competition? How do Ferraz and Finan (2011) test this hypothesis? What do they find?
- How can the quality of representation be improved according to Gulzar, Hai and Paudel (2020)? How do they test their claim?

Class 14 (Feb 18): Corruption

- Ferraz, Claudio, and Frederico Finan (2008) “Exposing Corrupt Politicians” the Effect of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- Bandiera, Oriana, Andrea Prat, and Tommaso Valletti (2009) “Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment” *American Economic Review*
- Olken, Ben (2007) “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,” *Journal of Political Economy*. [Jie]

Reading Guide/Questions for discussion:

- Theoretically speaking, what are the pros and cons of these two different strategies to decrease corruption: top-down monitoring and grassroots participation? How does Olken (2007) test which one is more effective? How does he measure corruption?
- Do Ferraz and Finan show that voters hold politicians accountable for their performance in office? Do public audits increase or decrease accountability? How? How does their result speak to the importance for political selection of an informed electorate and the role played by the media?
- What is the different between active and passive waste? Can both be considered forms of corruption? What are the sources of active and passive waste? What kind of waste decreases with more bureaucratic discretion? Why? How do Bandiera et al (2009) test these questions? What do they find?

Class 15 (Feb 23): Local governments under autocracies

- Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Nancy Qian, and Yang Yao (2017) “The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China: Theory and Empirical Evidence on the Autocrat’s Tradeoff,” Working Paper.
- Montinola, Gabriella, Yingyi Qian, and Berry R. Weingast (1995) “Federalism, Chinese Style. The Political Basis for Economic Success in China,” *World Politics*.
- Chen, Jidong, Jennifer Pan, and Yiqing Xu (2016) “Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China” *American Journal of Political Science*. [Henrik]

Reading Guide/Questions for discussion:

- Why would authoritarian regimes introduce local elections? What trade-off do autocrats face when considering local elections? How do Martinez-Bravo et al (2017) test this? What do they find?
- Theoretically speaking, do we expect an authoritarian government to be at all responsive? If yes, how? Why? How do Chen, Pan and Xu (2016) test this? What do they find?
- What is *market-preserving federalism*? What conditions created the right institutional environment for *market-*

preserving federalism according to Montinola, Qian and Weingast (1995)? Why/How did these characteristics matter?

Class 16 (Feb 25): Patronage Today

- Fiva, John H., Benny Geys, Tom-Reiel Heggedal, Rune Sørensen (2019) “Political Alignment and Bureaucratic Pay,” Working Paper.
- Colonnelli, Emanuele, Edoardo Teso, and Mounu Prem. 2020. “Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations,” *Working Paper*
- Cruz, Cesi, Julien Labonne, and Pablo Querubin (2017) “Politician Family Networks and Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines,” *American Economic Review*. [Shu-Han]

Reading Guide/Questions for discussion:

- What are the pros and cons of political influence over the selection of bureaucrats? Theoretically speaking, politician-bureaucratic alignment could increase or decrease the productivity of bureaucrats. Why? Do we think that the benefits of bureaucratic alignment are higher or lower for higher-level bureaucratic appointments? Why? How do Fiva et al 2019 test this? What do they find?
- Colonnelli, Prem and Teso (2019) claim that political connections are an important determinant of public employment in Brazilian municipalities today. They interpret this as evidence of patronage. What alternative stories could explain their findings?

Class 17 (Mar 2): Captured local governments

- Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Priya Mukherjee, and Andreas Stegman (2017) “The Non-Democratic Roots of Elite Capture: Evidence from Soeharto Mayors in Indonesia,” *Econometrica*.
- Carreri, Maria and Oeindrila Dube (2017) “Do Natural Resources Influence Who Comes to Power and How?” *Journal of Politics*. [Chanyoung (Young)]
- Di Cataldo, Marco, and Nicola Mastrorocco (2020) “Organised Crime, Captured Politicians and the Allocation of Public Resources,” Working Paper. [Jose]

Reading Guide/Questions for discussion:

- Each reading identifies a different actor/set of actors who can capture local governments. Identify these actors. Which conditions make capture more likely? Explain separately for each form of capture (for each reading). How does each paper test these hypotheses? What are the consequences of each form of capture on the allocation of public resources, governance, and electoral outcomes?

Class 18 (Mar 4): Policies: Open class – students will vote on the topic for this class

[Ryan][Alex]

Class 19 (Mar 9): Presentations

Class 20 (Mar 11): Presentations

Papers Due March 16 (through Canvas) by 12.00pm