

STATE OF CALIFORNIA DECISION OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD

REDDING ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT,)
Employer, APPELLANT,) Case Nos. S-R-437
and	j
REDDING TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, CTA/NEA,) PERB Order No. Ad-39
) Administrative Appeal
Employee Organization.) June 21, 1978

Appearances: Robert G. Walters, Attorney (Biddle, Walters and Bukey) for Redding Elementary School District; John Minoletti and Jack Polance, Attorneys (Barr and Minoletti) for Redding Teachers Association, CTA/NEA.

Before Gluck, Chairperson; Gonzales and Cossack Twohey, Members.

OPINION

This is an appeal by the Redding Elementary School District (hereafter District) from the executive assistant to the Board's rejection of the District's exceptions to the hearing officer's proposed decision dated January 3, 1978, in the above-captioned case.

FACTS

The hearing officer's proposed decision found that certain employees were not management employees within the meaning of the Educational Employment Relations Act. 1 The executive

¹Gov. Code sec. 3540 et seq.

assistant to the Board's rejection of exceptions was on the ground that they were not timely filed.

On January 5, 1978, the proposed decision of the hearing officer was received by the District. This proposed decision contained notice of the District's right to file exceptions. It stated:

The parties have seven (7) calendar days from receipt of this proposed decision in which to file exceptions in accordance with section 33380 of the Board's rules and regulations. If no party files timely exceptions, this proposed decision will become final on January 16, 1978, and a Notice of Decision will issue from the Board.

In addition, the Sacramento regional director's cover letter of January 3, 1978, to the hearing officer's proposed decision indicated that any party to the proceeding could file a statement of exceptions and stated:

An original and four copies of the statement of exceptions must be filed with the Board within seven (7) calendar days after receipt of the proposed decision as provided in section 33380 of the EERB's rules and regulations (Part III, title 8, Cal. Admin. Code).

As noted, the hearing officer's proposed decision was received by the District on January 5, 1978. Therefore, the last day for exceptions to be filed with the Public Employment Relations Board (hereafter Board) was January 12, 1978. The District's statement of exceptions

²Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 8, sec. 33020 states that:

File with Board. "File with the Board" or "File with the regional office" means personal delivery or actual delivery by certified mail to the Board.

was actually received at the Board headquarters in Sacramento on January 13, 1978. On January 16, 1978, the executive assistant to the Board, pursuant to rules 33380 and 33390, 3 issued the Board order declaring the proposed decision of the hearing officer to be the final decision.

DISCUSSION

In its appeal, the District contends that, read together, rules 32130^4 and 33380^5 result in a one-day "grace period" in the total time in which an appellant may file a timely statement of exceptions. Specifically, the District argues that reading these two sections together results in starting the appeal period "the day after the day after receipt."

By commencing the seven-day period for filing its statement of exceptions on January 7, 1978, the District argues, its filing on January 13, 1978, would have been within the noticed seven-day period for filing a statement of exceptions and was therefore timely.

 $^{^3}$ Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 8, sec. 33380 and 33390.

⁴Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 8, sec. 32130 states that:

Computation of Time. In computing any period of time under these rules and regulations, the period of time begins to run the day after the act or occurrence referred to.

 $^{^5}$ Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 8, sec. 33380(a) states that:

⁽a) A party may file with the Board an original and four copies of a statement of exceptions to the proposed decision, and supporting brief, within seven calendar days after receipt of the propose decision....

The District concedes that under the Board's present interpretation of these rules the period in which the District could file a timely statement of exceptions ended on January 12, 1978, but argues that this interpretation is incorrect. We disagree. The application of rule 32130 and rule 33380 caused the appeal period in this case to commence January 6, 1978; the "act of occurrence" to which rule 32130 refers is receipt by the District of the proposed decision on January 5, 1978.

The Board has previously counted the seven-day time period referred to in rule 33380 as beginning the day after the receipt by the parties of the proposed decision. 6

In its statement of exceptions, the District also contends that the seven-day filing period for filing a statement of exceptions in rule 33380 was too short and created hardships for the parties. That rule was adopted by the Board as a part of title 8, California Administrative Code, following duly noticed public hearings and in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. 7 It was determined that the specified time allowed for parties to file a statement of exceptions was adequate. The vast majority of parties who have filed statements of exceptions to a Board agent's proposed

⁶See, for example, <u>Los Angeles Unified School District</u> (11/8/77) EERB Order No. Ad-19.

 $^{^{7}}$ Gov. Code, tit. 2, div. 3, part 1, ch. 4.5, sec. 11371 et seg.

decision have, in fact, complied with the seven-day time requirement.

The District also argues that the Board's rules regarding deadlines and the definitions of such things as "service,"

"filing," and "receipt" are confusing and urges "a more relaxed view toward deadlines and the like." Experience with the rule fails to support that argument. The overwhelming number of filings have been in strict accordance with the rule's requirements.

Finally, we note that the District did not avail itself of the opportunity to request an extension of time in which to file a statement of exceptions.

ORDER

The decision issued by the executive assistant to the Board, PERB Decision No. HO-R-49, declaring the hearing officer's proposed decision to be final, is affirmed.

Harry Gluck, Chairperson Raymond J. Gonzal

Jerilou Cossack Twohey, Member, dissenting:

I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the executive assistant properly rejected the District's exceptions to the hearing officer's proposed decision.

In her dissent, Member Cossack Twohey refers to the sevenday appeal period provided by rule 33380 and indicated that the Board "tacitly determined" that seven days was an inadequate period when it modified this rule effective March 20, 1978. This is not correct. A majority of the Board modified rules 33380 and 35030 in order to consolidate and provide uniformity between the appeal procedures and timelines from hearing officer decisions on representation and unfair practice cases. In addition, the timelines were originally devised in order to expedite the establishment of negotiating units at the inception of the EERA. However, rapid processing of cases became impractical when the Board docket grew longer. There was then no need to continue the shorter appeal timelines.

On January 5, 1978, the District received the hearing officer's proposed decision. The District's exceptions were actually received by the Board on January 13, 1978, one day late under the thenexisting rules governing filing of exceptions.

This is yet another case, of which there have been many, ¹ in which a majority of the Board has mechanically applied an unreasonable rule so as to deny a party appellate review.

I agree with the District's counsel that the seven days provided in the rule itself did not afford sufficient time within which to review the facts and issues of the case, confer with the school district, hold a meeting of the school board, and write the exceptions themselves. In fact on March 8, 1978 the Board considered this deficiency among others, and modified the rule so that the parties now have twenty days within which to file exceptions. Thus, contrary to the majority's assertion in this case, the Board has tacitly determined that the time specified in this now-repealed rule was not adequate.

I do not advocate permitting parties to ignore the time requirements established by the Board's rules and regulations. However, neither should the basic purposes of the EERA be undermined by slavish adherence to rules which have shown themselves to be unreasonable and unrealistic. Rather, the long-established legal principle of not permitting minor procedural defects to preclude the examination of an actual controversy by an appellate body should prevail. ²

¹ Manteca Unified School District (8/5/77) EERB Decision No. 21; San Francisco Unified School District (9/8/77) EERB Decision No. 23; Santa Ana Unified School District (10/28/77) EERB Decision No. 36; Anaheim Union High School District (3/16/78) PERB Order No. Ad-27; and Lincoln Unified School District (5/30/78) PERB Order No. Ad-35.

²Pesce v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1958) 51 Cal.2d 310, 313; See also <u>Gibson v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board</u> (1973) 9 Cal.3d 494 and <u>Flores v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board</u> (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 681.

This principle is especially applicable to controversies arising under the EERA. Unlike most other arenas of litigation, the parties in a disputed case under the EERA enjoy an ongoing relationship which does not terminate with the completion of the litigation. Continuing relationships conducive to successful and harmonious problem solving—the essence of collective negotiations—demand that the parameters of the relationship have been fairly defined. When a dispute has been unfairly denied a full hearing by the Board entrusted with its resolution, the future harmonious relationship of the parties is jeopardized.

The problem in the instant case, the composition of the negotiating unit, is one at the very heart of this harmonious relationship. It is the cornerstone of the obligation to negotiate and further determines the parameters of this obligation. Permitting a minor procedural defect to forestall the

³Section 3540 of the Act declares it to be the purpose of this Act "...to promote the improvement of personnel management and employer-employee relations...by providing a uniform basis for recognizing the right of public school employees...to select one employee organization as the exclusive representative of the employees in an appropriate unit,.... To effectuate this policy Sections 3543.5(c) and 3543.6(c) of the Act impose a mutual obligation on an employer and an employee organization respectively to meet and negotiate in good faith. Section 3540.1(h) of the Act in turn defines meeting and negotiating as "...meeting, conferring, negotiating, and discussing by the exclusive representative and the public school employer in a good faith effort to reach agreement on matters within the scope of representation..." Section 3540.1(e) defines exclusive representative as "...the employee organization recognized or certified as the exclusive negotiating representative of ... employees in an appropriate unit...." Finally, Section 3543.2 of the Act defines those matters within the scope of representation.

Board's consideration of the District's position on this fundamental disagreement raises the genuine possibility that the disagreement will fester and perhaps distort and poison the entire negotiating relationship. Accordingly, I dissent.

By: Jerilou Cossack Twohey, Member

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD

Teadquarters Office 723 12th Street, Suite 201 Sacramento, California 95814 916) 322-3088



January 18, 1978

Mr. Mark A. Hyjek Biddle, Walters & Bukey 1127 11th Street, Suite 900 Sacramento, CA 95814

Re: Redding Elementary School District, Case Nos. S-R-437, S-UC-5

Dear Mr. Hyjek:

This will acknowledge receipt of the exceptions filed by the Redding Elementary School District in the above-captioned case. Unfortunately, your exceptions were not timely filed according to Section 33380 of the Board's rules and regulations.

Exceptions to the proposed decision were due to be filed by the District on January 12, 1978. Exceptions were not received in this office until January 13, 1978.

As a result of this failure to timely file, the enclosed exceptions cannot be submitted to the Board itself for consideration. Please be advised that while there are no rules to this effect, you are welcome to appeal this rejection of your filing to the Board itself. Should you choose to do so, your appeal should be filed in this office on or before ten calendar days from service of this communication.

Sincerely,

Stephen Barber

Executive Assistant

to the Board